Quantum key distribution provides unconditional security for communication. Unfortunately, current experimental schemes are not suitable for long-distance fiber transmission because of phase drift or Rayleigh backscattering. In this Letter we present a unidirectional intrinsically stable scheme that is based on Michelson-Faraday interferometers, in which ordinary mirrors are replaced with 90°Faraday mirrors. With the scheme, a demonstration setup was built and excellent stability of interference fringe visibility was achieved over a fiber length of 175 km. Through a 125 km long commercial communication fiber cable between Beijing and Tianjin, the key exchange was performed with a quantum bit-error rate of less than 6%, which is to our knowledge the longest reported quantum key distribution experiment under field conditions. © 2005 Optical Society of America OCIS code: 270.0270.
For the security of sensitive data transmission, a key must be securely exchanged between users. Until now, quantum key distribution (QKD) has been the only way to distribute a key with unconditional security through a public channel. 1, 2 Many QKD demonstrations have been performed over fibers or free space. 3, 4 A typical fiber QKD scheme is based on unbalanced fiber Mach-Zehnder interferometers, 5 which are unstable because of the environmentally dependent birefringence of fiber and temperature fluctuations. To overcome these shortcomings, a round-trip plug-and-play scheme has been designed and was applied in a fiber cable under Lake Geneva. 6 However, the scheme is of low efficiency because of Rayleigh backscattering and is unsafe from Trojanhorse attacks. 7 Use of a planar light-wave circuit Mach-Zehnder interferometer is another possible solution. 8 This technique improves the stability of the Mach-Zehnder interferometer but introduces some new problems, such as polarization sensitivity and the thermo-optic effects of a silica waveguide. 8 In this Letter we report a novel one-way, intrinsically stable QKD scheme that is free of fiber birefringence, and we describe its performance under field conditions. Figure 1 shows a schematic of our QKD setup for communication between Alice and Bob. A laser pulse is split into two pulses, P1 and P2, by coupler C1. Pulse P1, transmitting along the short arm, is directly reflected by Faraday mirror FM1 and comes back to coupler C1, while pulse P2 along the long arm is modulated by phase modulator PMa and reflected back to coupler C1 by Faraday mirror FM2 with a time delay. The pulses are coupled to a quantum channel and are transmitted to Bob as a sequence. After arriving at coupler C2, the sequence is split into two groups again and reflected back by Faraday mirrors. The group that goes through the long arm is modulated by phase modulator PMb. As delay line DL1 is equal to DL2, the pulses that pass through ͑L a , S b ͒ and ͑S a , L b ͒ arrive at coupler C2 at the same time and interfere with each other. The interference output at C2 will be detected by single-photon detector SPD1 or SPD2, depending on the phase difference of the pulses. By control of PMa and PMb, Alice and Bob can establish a secure key sequence with singlephoton QKD protocols such as BB84 and B92. For security reasons, some additional components are used. A variable optical attenuator (ATT) is used by Alice to attenuate laser pulses to a pseudo single-photon source. To prevent possible Trojan-horse attacks, optical circulators CIR1 and CIR2 are arranged at the output of Alice's security zone and at the input of Bob's security zone, respectively; detector DA is used to monitor possible Trojan-horse photons.
In fact, it is easily seen that the interferometers used in our system are unbalanced Michelson inter- ferometers, in which ordinary mirrors are replaced by Faraday mirrors. This is the reason why we refer to our system as a Faraday-Michelson system. A Faraday mirror is a combination of a 45°Faraday rotator and an ordinary mirror whose Jones matrix is given by
͑1͒
It can automatically compensate for any birefringence effect in fiber. For example, a beam of light passes through a birefringent medium and is reflected by a Faraday mirror. The matrices for forward and backward propagation can be described by
͑2͒
where i ͑i = o , e͒ are the propagation phases of ordinary and extraordinary rays and is the rotation angle between the reference basis and the eigenmode basis of the birefringent medium. So the overall Jones matrix T for a round trip is given by
where = o + e . Equation (3) shows that the polarization of the outgoing state is always orthogonal to that of the incoming state, regardless of the birefringence of the medium and the input polarization state.
In what follows, we show the intrinsic stabilization of the Faraday-Michelson system. For clarity and conciseness we consider all fibers to be birefringence components. S ជ a and S ឈ a denote forward and backward Jones matrices of the fiber between C1 and FM1, L ជ a and L ឈ a denote the matrices of the fiber between C1 and FM2, and PM ជ a and PM ឈ a denote the matrices of Alice's phase modulator, respectively. The corresponding matrices at Bob's side are denoted by a subscript b. QC (Fig. 1) represents the matrix of the quantum channel from Alice to Bob. Optical circulators are considered polarization independent and ignored in the following discussion. Thus it is easy to write the transformation matrices of two interference pulses as follows:
where la , sa , lb , and sb are propagation phases of corresponding components; a and b are electronically modulated phases operated by Alice and Bob, respectively. Suppose that the input Jones vector is Ẽ in at Alice's side; the output of Bob's interferometer can be written as
where is the factor that describes the total loss of the system. Thus the interference output is expressed as
where
The fringe visibility of the system can be deduced easily:
Equation (7) shows that the Faraday-Michelson system gives perfect interference, which has little to do with the polarization characteristic of interferometer and has less to do with that of the quantum channel. This means that the Faraday-Michelson system will keep stable even if the polarization characteristics of the system vary randomly. Based on the scheme, an experimental setup is built. The photons are generated by a strongly attenuated 1550 nm distributed-feedback pulsed laser diode with a pulse width of 1 ns. The intensity ratio of reference pulse P1 to encoded pulse P2 is 4:1, because the one-way insertion loss of the LiNbO 3 phase modulator is 3 dB. To satisfy security constraints, coded pulse P2 is attenuated to 0.1 photon/pulse when it leaves Alice's security zone. An id200 singlephoton detector (id Quantique, Switzerland) is used to detect signal photons, whose measured minimum dark-count rate is 8 ϫ 10 −7 per gate, with a gate width of 2.5 ns. The pulses of a 1310 nm laser are transmitted from Alice to Bob as a time reference. The delay line is ϳ1.5 m. The quantum channel is a 175 km long fiber in a lab.
With the setup described above, the interference fringe visibility was measured; the result is shown in Fig. 2(a) . After 50 h the average visibility is 97.3% and the standard deviation is 0.64%, even though the setup is operated in a noisy room without any special vibration isolation or damping. However, even when the quantum channel is shorter than 75 km, the fringe visibility of the Mach-Zehnder interferometer system has shown an evident and random variation after half an hour. 9 According Eq. (7), the fringe visibility of an ideal Faraday-Michelson system should be 100%, but the measured visibility is only 97.3%. This discrepancy is caused by differences of the phase modulators' insertion losses and the asymmetry of the two interferometers. Figure 2 (b) shows a slow phase drift of the setup. It corresponds to a drift of ⌬ a + ⌬ b in Eq. (6) and is introduced mainly by environmental disturbances such as temperature fluctuations. This slow phase drift will cause a variation of the operating points of the key exchange and add an additional quantum biterror rate (QBER) in the raw keys. To solve the problem, additional operations are executed before ordinary QKD operations: Bob acquires an interference fringe by driving phase modulator PMb with a ramp voltage and finds the correct driving voltage for the key exchange.
With our setup, practical key exchanges have been performed in the lab. Figure 3 shows the relationship of the transmission distance to the QBER. The stars show experimental data, and the solid curve is theoretical. Considering a QBER of 11% as the security limit for a QKD, we performed a long-term stable QKD over 150 km with our system in the lab. Furthermore, the same setup was used in field conditions. The sender, Alice, was located in Beijing, and the receiver, Bob, in Tianjin. Two stations were connected by a 125 km installed commercial fiber cable by the China Network Communications Group Corporation (CNC). The total attenuation of the cable was ϳ26 dB. The experimental results show that the setup can work in the CNC's noisy gateway rooms day and night without any break. The long-term QBER is 6%, which is only 1% higher than that in lab at the same transmission distance.
In summary, we have designed a unidirectional intrinsic-stabilization quantum key distribution scheme that is free of polarization disturbances caused by quantum channel and optical devices in the system. The experimental results show a stable and high fringe visibility. Keys have been exchanged over 150 km fiber in the lab and over 125 km installed commercial fiber cable between Beijing and Tianjin. 
